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Dynamical Interpretation of Leibniz's Continuum 
Abstract 
This dynaınical interpretation of the continuum is based on a threefold 
perspective. First, detai led differentiation of all standard realms of Leibnizian 
Weltanschauung - (R real). (P phenomenal), (1 ideal ). Second, analysis of the 
scope of the Law of Continuity famously formulated by Leibniz and mapping it 
on to this (RPI) structure. Third, fınding the precise place of dynamics and fo rce in 
this (RPI) continuum. 
These perspectives (taxonomical , legislative and junctional) if put together lead to 
a new understanding of monads' role; and they are not taken anymore as a 
discreet part of Leibnizian philosophy (as opposed to the ideal space and time), 
but as dynamical continuum incorporating in itself both contiguity and continuity. 
And in such a way they are both neutra/izing and preserving the syncategorematic 
phenomenal infınity. The main poinı is that force can be applied both to 
perception and appetition of monads and by this we give the shor1est Leibnizian 
answer to the Zeno's Dichotomy paradox- "force". But what is more imporlant, 
such dynaınical interpretation gives good schematic and systemade view of 
Leibnizian mature philosophy. And it appears (as expected) that the thread out of 
the Labyrinth of the Continuum is not only geometrical and physical, but 
metaphysical too. 
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Leibniz'deki Continuum'un Dinamik Bir Yorumu 
Özet 
Continuum'un dinamik olan bu yorumu üçlü bir perspektife dayanmaktadır. ilkin 
Leibnizci Weltanschauung ' un bütün standart gerçekli k le~nin - (R gerçek), (P 
fenomenal), (1 ideal)- detaylı olarak ayrımlaşurılması. Ikinci olarak, Leibniz 
tarafından çok iyi bir biçimde formüle edilmi ş olan süreklilik yasasının 
kapsammın bir analizi ve onun bu (RPI) yapısının Uzerine yerleştirilmesi. Üçüncü 
Asst. Prof. at the Faculty of Philosopy, University of Sotia, Bulgaria. 
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olarak ise bu (RPI) continuum'unda dinamiğin ve gücün tam olarak yerinin 
' belirlenmesi. 
Eğer bu üç perspektif (sınıflayıc ı , kural koyucu, ve birleştiric i ) bir araya getirili rsc 
monadlann rolünün yeni bi r kavrayışına yol açar; ve monadlar artık sadece 
Leibnizci felsefenin sağduyulu parçaları olarak değil (ideal uzay ve zamana karşı 
olarak), fakat hem bitişikliği hem de sürekliliği kendi içine katan dinamik bir 
continuum olarak ele alınacaktı r. Ve böylesi bir yolla onlar, syncategorematic 
fenomenal sonsuzluğu hem etkisizleştirecek hem de muhafaza edecektir. Temel 
husus, gücün, monadlann algılanna ve iştihalanna uygulanabilir olmasıdır, ve 
bununla biz, Zenon'un Dikotomi paradoksuna Leibnizci cevabın en kısasını 
vermiş oluyoruz: "Güç". Fakat daha da önemli olan şey, böylesi dinamik bir 
yorumun, olgun Leibnizci felsefenin iyi şemalik ve sistematik bir görünüşünü 
vermesidir. Ve görünüyor ki (beklenildiği gibi), Continuum Labirentinden çıkış 
yolu sadece geometrik ve fiziksel değil, fakat aynı zamanda metafızikseldir. 
Anahtar Terimler 
Leibniz, Sürekl ilik Yasası , Conıinuum, Güç, Monad, Syncategorematic, 
Categorematic, Uzay, Zaman, Dinamik, Süreklilik, Bitişiklik , Zenon, Dikotomi, 
Metafizik, Algı, İştiha, Sonsuzluk. 
This paper is based on the recent scholarship and almost facet analys is by 
Richard Arthur, Glen Hartz, Jan Cover, Samuel Levey, Timothy Crockett, and François 
Duchesneau on Leibnizian continuum and philosophy. What I will try to do is a 
selective canceptual summary, also some corrections, and of course one further step -
which I think changes the fina! perspective - a dynamical interpretation of the 
continuum. This whole analysis is actually based on a threefold perspective. Here are 
my main departing points: 
First, we have to differentiate a ll the realms of Leibnizian Weltanschauung. 
Second we have to trace what exactly is the scope of the Law of Continuity famously 
formulated by Leibniz in 1704 . And at the end we have to see what the precise place of 
dynamics in such continuum is. 
But because all these perspectives (taxonomical , legislative and junc tio na l) are 
interconnected with in his philosophy (though changing until his mature thought), that 's 
why my exposition will be rather systematİcal than chronological. On the othe r hand I 
will try to make my idea as clear as possible and I will artificially divide the paper in 
three sections; but keep in mind that systematicity of Leibniz ' s philosophy is the 
structural basis of my reading and the threefold paper division is propound only because 
it is more economical and neat. 
I. Weltanschauung- the three Leibnizian realms 
As the old inte rpretatio n o n Leibniz has put it "[he] splits the rea lm o f the actual 
into two do mains: the realm of monads, the real world, which forms the object of study 
ofmeıaphysics; and the realm of the ıhings o f our everyd ay experience, the plıenomenal 
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world, which forms the object of study of the sciences in general, but pre-eminently of 
physics." [italics added( So we have the standard Rescher split: Monads (the real 
w~rld presen~ed by _meta~hysics] and Things [the phenomenal world presented by 
scıences]; whıch, I thınk, stıll governs modern interpretations but ina more subtle form. 
But contemporary and recent scholarship is much more precise in its terminology 
and analys is of Leibniz's texts and thoughts. So we can advance one further division 
which separates Leibnizian Weltanschauung in three. In this paper I will try to show 
that the continuum problem is anather cruc ial differentiation mark between these realms 
of the world: (1 ) monads; (2) things; (3) space and time. The fu ll argument for 
separating them can be found in the detailed research by Hartz and Cover2 - I will recall 
just 3 points from their conclusion: 
(R) Monads have full and no n-derivative reality (R). 
(P) O nl y body - not every non-fundamental entity - is to be grounded on 
monads; and to be grounded means that you are not real as monads but plıenomenal ( P ). 
(I) Space and time are abstract entities (derived directly from phenomenal world 
and accessible by thought) and be ing abstract is a feature of ideal ( /) things. 
This (R)-(P)-(1) struc ture is hierarchical in such a way that every state is 
grounded on its left-standing realm. The analysis of Hartz and Cover covers mainly the 
connection between the phenomenal and ideal world, the monads are left out of the 
dynamical picture although they are important s tructural partintheir paper too3. 
So we have 3 d ifferent realms- (R) subsıanıial, (P) quasi-substantial and (1) res 
mentalis4. Hartz and Cover interpretation is really strong and profound, but because the 
task they had defined w as limited they di d n ' t present a full analysis on the scope of the 
continuity, although it was central issue for the differentiatio n between (P) and (I). 
What I would !ike to do here is to map the Law o f Continuity on this structure5 - this 
will make the distinction clearer but will bring further questions. 
Nicholas Rescher. Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy (Totowa: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1979) 65. 
Glenn A. Hanz and J . A. Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," Noı'is 22, 
no. 4 (1988). 
Their concentration on P-1 connection and differentiation is inevitable and logical- clarifying 
this relation is paper's main message and contribution. But Hartz and Cover wrote: "We 
believe it is possible to complete a 'reduction ' of space and time to monads; doing so requires 
the use of purely Leibnizian materials to show how ideal space and time are re_lated, via the 
intermediate level of phenomenal bodies. to features of monads. But that ı s a separate 
project." Well , partially ı want to add several steps to this separate and more complete 
reading. 
Hartz and Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," 503-~ .. 
Timothy Crockett noticed that Leibniz is applying the Law of Contınuıty on these three 
levels but stili maintained that there are "two notions of continuity" following the twofold 
actual~ideal division _ Timothy Crockett, "Continui ty in Le!b~iz's Matu~e M~taphysics;" 
Philosoplıical Studies 94, no. 1-2 ( 1999): ı 19-20. Compare hı s ınterpretatıon wıth Levey s 
histarical analysis on the two types of continuity: "potentiality" and "connectedness" -
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II. Law of Continuity in (P)-realm and (1)-realm 
W e have three different realms; but what is the implicatio n of the legislative part 
of Le ibnizian philosophy o n them? I mean - what is the scope of the famo us Law of 
Continuity on those realms and how does it work in ideal, phenomenal and real world? 
And if it is uni versal and covers everything is it one and the same law actually or it is 
limited and does have exceptions? 
Let me start with the law itself, formulared in New Essays on the Human 
U nderstanding (1704); Leibniz states that there are nowhere leaps: "Nothing takes place 
suddenly, and it is one of my great and best confi rmed axioms that natu.re never makes 
leaps [la nature ne fa it j amais des sa u ts]. I call this the Law of Continuity" 6. 
So instead of stages we have continuous degrees; this is a straightfor ward and 
clear statement but the problem is that on the other hand we have exactly the opposite 
statements by the same Leibniz: "Matter is not co ntinuous but discrete, and actually 
infinitely divided" (to De Volder, l l Oct, 1705)7; "In actuals there is only d iscrete 
quantity" (to De Volder, 19 Jan, l706r More than 10 years earlier Leibniz wrote to 
Foucher: "Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not, I do not say 
d ivisible, but actually divided; and that consequently the least particle ought to be 
considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures"9 and he sa id to Sophia 
that ~atter only appears to us to be continuum, just as does actual motion10; this is 
because matter is a discrete q uantity and "the mass of bodies is actuall y divided in a 
determinate manner, and nothing in it is precisely continuous"1 1 and things mo ve from 
one state to the next closest state
12 
and so on, and so on and even more ... 
Reading such contradictory passages R ussell made his witty remark: "In spite of 
the law of continuity, Leibniz's philosophy may be deseribed as a complete denial of 
the continuous"
13
. In a forthco ming paper Richard Arthur is showing that if you 
introduce the idea of syncategorematic infuıity incompatibility between these vario us 
Samuel Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts of Continuity in Leibniz," Philosophical Stıtdies 
94, no. 1-2 (1999). 
6 Gottfried Leibniz, "Die Philosophischcn Schriften Von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz," in OLMS 
Paperbacks (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1965), V, 49. Even earlier (Apri l 3'd. 1699) he 
had already written to De Volder that no transition occurs by a leap - "nullarn transitionem 
fıeri per saltum" Leibniz, "Gp," II, 168. 
, Revera materia non continuum sed di seretum est actu in infinitum divisum . . . " Leibniz. 
"Gp," II, 278. 
, In Actualibus non esse nissi dieretarn Quantitatem . . . " Ibid., II, 282. 
"Ainsi je crois qu' il n'y a aucune partic de la nature qui ne soir, je ne dis pas divisible mais 
actuellement divisee, et par consequent la moindre parcelle doit erre consideree comme un 
monde plein d'une infınite de creatures differentes" 1bid. , I, 416. 
ıo . 
·· ıt is our imperfection and the shortcomings of our senses that make us conceive physical 
things as mathematical entities, in which there is indeterminacy" Ibid .. VII, 563. 
ı ı lbid., VII, 562. 
ıı , d'un estat a l'autre prochain" lbid., VII, 564. 
ıJ Berrrand Russell, A Critica[ Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, with an AppendLr: of 
Leading Passages (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University PresslMacınillan, 1900) 
lll. 
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statements is only.apparent. So Arthur is exonerating Leibniz from Russell 's criticism 
~nd at the en? of hıs analysis he says: ·'All natura lly occurring transitions are continuous 
ın that the dıfference be tween neiglıborilıg states is sınaller than any assignable. T his 
~eans not that th~re exists a least d ifference, but that for any assignable fınite 
dıfference, there exısts a sınaller o ne. Thus there is a true continuous transition, even 
though the states themselves and a ll assignable diffe rences between them are actually 
discrete." [italics added] 14. 
But stili it sounds !ike a puzzle, like a labyrinth - what kind of solution is 
Arthur's? Let me surnmarize everything in a few words to show more clearly the 
paradox: we have differem statements in Leibniz which Russell claims that contradict 
each other and Arthur just puts them together - "continuous neighboring states" or 
"continuous transitio n of actually di serete states"15. Is this a real solution to Russell 's 
attacks? And what is this 'syncategorematic' here for? 
Categorematic vs. syncategorematic 
The idea about syncategorematic interpretation of Leibniz is brought maybe for 
the first time by Ishiguro 16 in 70 's and it is getti ng more and more powerful. But if we 
want to understand he r or Arthur 's defense and the validity of their interpretation we 
have to start from defıning the notions o f 'categorematic infınity ' and 'syncategorematic 
infinity' , i.e. Arthur's: 
(C) categorematic - there exists some <y> which is greater than any fınite 
number <x>; or tlıere isa p rime greater than every finite prime. 
(S) syncategorematic - for any finite number <x> there is a number <y> greater 
than it; or for every finite prim e the re isa greater prime
11
. 
As Arthur po ints out there many cases where a m istake can be done by assuroing 
that categorematic and syncategorematic infinity are one and the same; in other words 
14 Richard T. W. Arthur, ", A Complete Denial of the Continuous"? Leibniz's Law of 
Continuity," in Synthese (forthcoming), 33. 
15 We can trace the same issue in Crockett's proposal that there are things structurally 
continuous (S-continuous) and discrete (non M-continuous) but there's nothing discontinuous 
- Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mat u re Metaphysics," 132. Or even more literal Iy 
paradoxical: discreteness of motion does not entai l that motion İS · an aggregate of discrete 
states- Crocken, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 133. 
16 The base for Arthur's interpretation is the paraHel which he makes between Leibniz's 
contradictory remarks about conıinuiry and identical contradictory remarks. on the 
infinitesima/s. Arthur cites Jshiguro because she already had showed that the solut1on about 
the later contradictions lies in differentiation between syncategorematic and categorematic 
infınity, so Arthur tries to mak e a parall el solution: "Just as an actual infınity of terms can be 
understood syncategorematically as more terms than can be assigned a number, without the~e 
being any infınite numbers, so ıoo the infınitely smal l can be gıven a . syncategorematıc 
interpretation by means of the Law of Continuity, without there exıstıng any actual 
infınitesimals" _ Arthur, ",A Complete Denial of the Continuous"? Leibniz's Law of 
Continuity," 33. 
17 lbid., 7-8. 
Dynamical Interpretation of Leibniz's Continuum 
56 ~KUY2t ıoostıo 
it's a fallacy to say that (C) "there is a prime greater than every fı nite prime" = (S) "for 
every fınite prime there isa greater prime". And the fallacy is quantifıer shift fallacy 18. 
The point is almost clear, but I want to make a smail correction and to offer a 
visual metaphor: because in (S) we have Archimedean axiom (as Leibniz knew), so we 
don' t have biggest or smallest number and as a result the infınity is not number at all , 
that's why we can picture th is by "ellipsi s": [ . . . ]. And (C) is not that we have greater 
number, as Arthur formulated it, but we have greatest, so we can picture it as "full stop" 
[.) - and it is now getting clear why (S) can be treated as infı nity and why (C) is not so 
suitable for Leibniz ... Of course I have to be more precise in this case and write "no t so 
suitable for Leibniz after 1676" ; because before 1676 he made several attempts to grasp 
the continuum through categorematic infınity, using indivisible points, unassignable 
gaps, infınitesimallines ... The difference between (C) and (S) w ili be even clearer if we 
compare them in a simple scheme. 
Early categorematic solutions 
In anather very interesting forthcoming paper19 Arthur traces the elusive 
development of Leibniz's early thought on the status of the actually infınitely smail in 
relation to the continuum. He distinguishes three different categorematic stages prior to 
167620. From canceptual point of view they can be regarded not only as stages (which 
are abandoned one by one by Leibniz) but also as different perspectives towards th~ 
continuum problem. I will only summarize them in a scheme, because they do no t have 
direct connection with my dynarnical interpretation: 
Leibniz's categorematic solutions. Mainly based on Arthur' s paper 
Table Ol 
Level A. Metaphysical B. Physical C. Mathematica1 
Period Pre- 1670 1670-7 1 1672-75 
Co ınınon Francisco Arriaga, Ho b bes Sextus Empiricus, Hobbes 
ground Ka lam; 
Main Void Parts (partes); Lines (linea); 
notions (quietulas; esse nihi1) Endeavor (conatus) Endeavor (conatus) 
Arthur's the continuum consists the continuum is composed a continuous line is coınposed 
definition of assignable poinıs of an infınity of indivisible of infınitely many infınitesimal 
separated by points, or parts sınaller lines, each of which is divisible 
unassignable gaps; than any assignable, with and proportional to an element 
no gaps between them: (conaıus) of a generating 
motion at an instant; 
18 lt isa very original and clear difference, lbid., 8. 
19 "From Actuals To Fictions: Four Phases in Leibniz's Early Thought On Infinitesimals" will 
appear in Studia Leibnitiana. 
20 Another interesting analysis on Leibniz' s changing thought during these years is Levey, 
"Matter and Two Co ncepts of Continuity in Leibniz" . 
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Explanation ( 1) Continuity of ( 1) Continuum is ( 1) Cootinuum is composed of 
motion is interrupted composed of in fi nitely infini tely smail extended 
by unassignable smail indivisibles, defined indi visibles, defined as paıts 
intervals of rest - times as parts which have which have magnitude 
sınaller than any given. magnitude. but no proponional to the conatus of 
extension: the generating motion; 
(2) Bodies are 
continually (re)created. (2) Continuity of motion is 
established through its 
composition out of conaıus 
or endeavours 
(3) Leibniz attempts to 
distinguish minima (having 
zero magnitude) from 
indi visibles (having zero 
extension); 
Leibniz's lnverted version of Zeno' s Diagonal paradox by Sextus 
argument Diclıotomy argument Empiricus 
Sources De rationibus motus Theoria Motus Absıraeti De mini mo et maximo 
(1669-70) (167 ı ) (1672-73) 
l..etter to Thomasius 
(April 30th, 1669) 
As we can see Leibniz made several attempts to solve the continuum puzzle 
within itself, looking for different types of compositional indivisibles. And fınally he 
couldn ' t fınd any categoremacity in this phenomenal world, which immediately made it 
"dependent on". This is my fırst step towards the dynamical interpretation of the 
continuum. 
Fina/ syncategorematic solution 
After 1676 Leibniz realized that the mathematics cannot provide caıegoremacity 
too (for any phenomenal realm), because there is no such thing as infınite number; and 
by number he meant something that can unite multiplicity. So here is the analogous 
scheme about the syncategorematic sol ution proposed by Leibniz. 
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Leibniz 's syncaıegorematic solutio11. Mainly based on Artlıur 's paper 
Table 02 
Levcl A. Mathematica l 
Period After 1676 
Common Archimedes 
ground 
Main notions lnfinitesimals are fictions (fictionem) 
Arthur' s ,infın i tesimals are fictitious entities, which may be usedas compendia loquendi to 
definition abbreviate mathematica ı reasoning; they serve as a shorthand for the fact that fın ite 
variable quantities may be ıaken as smail as desired , and so smail that the resulting 
error fa lls within any preset margin of error" 
Explanation ( 1) If infınitesimals are fictitious entities that mean that you cannot use the ideal 
mathematical realm as continuum wıity. ln fınites imals are j ust abstractions which 
cannot un i te physical aggregates. 
(2) Our phenomenal realm cannot be dependent on our ideal realm. 
Leibniz's No infinite number or infini te whole 
argument 
Sourccs Pacidius Philalethi ( I 676) 
Nurneri infıniti ( 1676) 
This was Leibniz' s fina! solution about geometrizatian of the continuum. That 
means - mathematics cannot provide the needed independence (categorematicity) for 
our phenomenal realm. This will lead us closer to his fina! systematical (neither purely 
idealist, nor materialist) account. But Jet me go ahead and deep in this syncategorematic 
solutio n. 
Syncategorematic continuum vs. Ideal conıinuum 
Quite often syncategorematic infinity is defined as potential and categorematic 
infınity as actual. E xactl y here lies the important change and paradox which we are 
revealing in Leibniz, because he is ta! king about acıual syncategorematic infinity . What 
does this concept mean? 
On one hand it is actual and for Leibniz that meant finite; because there is no 
such thing as infinite number (numbers are e ither even or odd - 1, 2, 3, 4 .. . )21 ; but on 
the other hand it is syncategorematical , which means infinite (there is always more to 
count and there are everywhere middle terms). So what we have here is exactly what 
both Russell and Arthur noticed from d ifferent perspectives - we have strange mixture 
21 
" ... infınity, that is to say the accumulation of an infınite number of substances, is, properly 
speaking, not a whole any more than infinite number itself, whereof one cannot say whether İl 
is even or uneven." Tlıeodicy § 195, Leibniz. "Gp," VI, 232. 
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between actual division and infini ty of the division. But do we have real continuunı 
than? Russell will say no, Arthur, I th ink, wi ll say yes. B ut I claim that Russe ll would be 
right though he didn ' t understood Le ibniz' s po int and Arthur would be partia lly wrong 
though he got the path out o f the labyrinth. Here is my explanation of th is obscure 
answer: 
The phenomenal world is d iscrete and Le ibniz sa id it many-many times - every 
. . ,.., 
ınterpretatıon starts and shou ld sta rt wirh this--. But o n the other hand between every 
two th ings and states there are always more and more. T han he added that the margin of 
error between "continuo us" c ircle and infınite l y-sided "discrete" body is alması null . 
But this is not a ntology anymo re; it is part of his epistemo logy and of course the error 
is null in exac tly the same way as matter appears to be continuous. The discreetness is 
so dense tha t the error be tween continuous (circle) and non-continuous (body) is 
unassignable . W e can check ana ther interesting example: "we know that a given e ll ipse 
approaches a paraba la as closely as desired, so that when the second focus of the ell ipse 
is removed far eno ugh away from the fırst focus, the d ifference between the e llipse and 
the parabala becomes less than any given difference, since then the radi i fro m that 
distant focus d iffer fro m paraHel lines by an amo unt as smail as desired"23. So when 
Arthur and Le ibniz talk abo ut assignability they are o nly within the discourse of 
epistemo logy. B ut fro m o ntological perspective there is discreetness to infınity in the 
matter - the more it is actually divided the less it is really continuous. The phenomenal 
world is dense contiguum and not rea l continuum - "Contiguous things are those 
between which there is no d istance"24 . We have o nly syncategorematicity (i nfı nite 
actual density) whic h is different fro m the continuum o f space and time where we don' t 
have any discreetness o nly the who le itself and the divisio n in this ideal realm would be 
derivative and possible: "But space and time taken together constitute the order o f 
possibilities of the one e ntire un i verse , so that these orders-space and time- re Iate not 
only to what actua lly is but a lso to anything that could be put in its place, j ust as 
numbers are indiffereni to the things w/ıiclı can be enumeratecf'25 . 
So, I th ink we have to keep the di fference between (P)-realm conti nuum and (1)-
realm co ntinuum in orde r to unde rstand further distinct ions between the phenomenal 
22 I am not convinced that we have to make such anificial di fferent iation as Crockett did: 
discreetness (different things) is not discontinui ıy (having gaps) - Crocken, "Continuity in 
Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics.". Especially if having ~uc~ remarks by ~ibniz: "in .~r~er .to 
have a variety of boundaries arising in matter a dıscontmuıry oj the part s ıs necessary [ıtalıcs 
added] - Gottfried Leibniz, "Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Samıl iche Schri ften Und Briefe," 
(Darrnstadt!Leipzig: Otto Reichl Verlag, 1923-.. .), VI-2~ 435. And o.ne co~ent from .. Levey: 
"(matter] is not continuous but discrete; its parts are st rıctly dıscontınuous - Levey. Maller 
and Two ConcepısofContinui ty in Leibniz," 83-84. 
23 Leibniz, "Ag," VI-4, 2032. . . . . 
24 Ibid., YI-3, 94; translation in _ Gottfried Leibniz, The Labymıth oj ılıe Contınuıwı:· Wrıtmgs 
on the Continuunı Problem, 1672-1686. ed. Daniel Garber and Robert C. Sleıgh, trans. 
Richard T. W. Arthur, The Ya/e Leibniz (Yale: Yale University Press, 2001 ) 19. 
ıs Leibniz, "Gp," IV, 568. 
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and ideal, between matter and space, between motion and time, between parts and the 
whole26 ... 
Let's make a quick summary: the Law of Continuity works within phenomenal 
world in such a way that it manifests itself as syncategorematical where contiguous 
approaches continuum (and the differentiating error between them is null) but stili there 
isa difference between this phenomenal world and the realm of abstract space and time. 
The difference is sınaller than any assignable, says Leibniz, but fro m fundamental level 
we can state the difference with his own words: "In actual, single terms are prior to 
aggregates, in ideals the whole is prior to the part" (to Des Bosses, 31 July, 1709)
27
. Of 
course you cannot assign such a qualitative d ifference, but you can state it. So what we 
see are syncategorematically infınite aggregates, not wholes, and aggregates are 
fundamentally discrete (though actually infınitel y divided and approaching continuity). 
Such an unassignable error is quite close to Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles. W e can 
use now this famous principle as a test-question: is it one and the same case to have a 
syncategorematically-sided body and continuous circle? If we talk about quantity- yes. 
But if we talk about quality - no. One thing can approach the other only if we keep this 
difference; and only than abstract mathematics can measure our pheno menal world. 
And when we think about fundamentals is not about usability and errors, but it is abo ut 
priority: , Matter is not continuous but discrete, and actually infinitely divided, though 
no assignable part of space is without matter. But space, !ike time, is something not 
substantia l, but ideal, and consists in possibilities, or in an order of coexistents that is in 
some way possible. And thus there are no divisions in it but such as are made by the 
mind, and the part is posterior to the wlıole. In real things, on the contrary, uııits are 
prior to the multitude and multitudes exist o nly through units" [italics added]28. 
Than why dealing so much with phenomenal if we have an ideal realm? Because 
extension is prior to space, as duration is prior to time. Space and time derive from 
phenomenal world and the (P)-realm is the foundation of the (1)-rea\m. lt seems that 
syncategorematic continuum (parts prior the whole) is the foundation of abstract 
continuum (whole prior the parts)29. How is it possible? 
Syncategorematic infinity - a well-fowıded phenomenon 
Before going to junctional part of this paper let me be clear on one more po int -
the division (or cut) does not produce this phenomenal world; the division is only a 
26 Jus remember that space and time are "are perfect/y uniform and arbitrarily clivisible" [italics 
addedj - Hartz and Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic," 499. 
27 
"In actualibus simplicia sunt anteriara aggregatis, in idealibus totum est prius parte" -
Leibniz, "Gp," Il, 379. 
28 
"Revera materia non continuum sed discretum est actu in infinitum divisum, etsi nulla pars 
spatii assignabilis materia vacet. At spatium, ut tempus, non substantiale est quiddam, sed 
ideale. et in possibilitatibus seu ordine coexistentium utcunque possibili consistit. Itaque 
nullae ibi divisiones nisi quas mens facit , et pars toto posterior est. Contra in realibus unitates 
multitudine sunt priores. nec existunt multitudines nisi per unitates"- lbid., II , 278-79. 
29 
lf we put it this way it is clear that something is rnissing - both in epistemological and in 
ontological domain. And what is rnissing is the real world. the (R)-realm. 
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manifestaıion of its infinity and a diffe rentiation between the first and second matter. 
But what makes or produces the phe nomenal rea lm is rlıe connection of its infınite parts, 
which put together make aggregates. So if left alone the syncategorematic infınity 
would lead to dissociation. And here we can see once more the diffe rence between the 
(1)-realm and (P)-realm. In the abstract realm there is no dissociation, because we have 
the whole as its basis and the division (or the cut) j ust discloses its a priori continuity. 
Leibniz even wrote that in ideal realm " the notion of the whole is simpler than that of 
fractions, and precedes it" [italics added]30. But for pheno menal rea lm we need 
something e lse which will neutralize and preserve its syncategorematic i nfınite division 
- it cannot be (an abstract) space, because Leibniz is relationist and do not use space 
and time as substratum. Concerning this frenetic di visio n (that I claim would lead to 
dissociation) Leibniz wrote to Fo ucher (1693): "Thus I believe that there is no part of 
matter which is not, I do not say divisible, but actually divided; and that consequently 
the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of infinity of di fferent 
creatures"31• This tho ught is a lread y conceptualized in Theory of concrete motion 
(1670-167 1) where he famo usly stated that every atom will be of infinite species 
[quaelibet a to mus erit infi nitarum specierum] and there are worlds within worlds to 
infinity [mundi in mundis in infınitum]32 and within every fold in the fold there is 
ana ther endlessly folded world. What makes this split (approaching continuum) 
tenable? How it doesn' t fa ll apart - Imean both the phenomenal world and Leibniz' s 
conception? 
Or we can state it as Stuart Brown: "[the problem is] how anything that is 
extended in space o r time can be real if each of its parts is further divisible ad 
infinitıan"33 . If we are Iooking for reality we have to switch the realm. So its time to 
analyze the real world, because if we want to make consistent continuum theory we 
have to apply the Law o f Continuity to all the realms of the Leibnizian Weltanschauung. 
III. Dynamics- the (R)-realm 
Up to now we Ieft (R)-world someho w out of the picture. So what are the 
characteristics of this realm? Immediate , short answer: these are the characteristics of 
the monads themsel ves
34
. 
30 Letter to Electress Sophie (31 Oct, 1705)- Leibniz, "Gp," VII, 56~. . . . . . 
31 Ai n si je crois qu'il n'y a aucune parti e de la matiere qui ne soit,_ Je ne dı s p~ dıvı sıble, maıs 
actuellement divisee, et par consequent, la moindre paı:icelle doıt estr: consıd_eree :o~e un 
monde plein d'une infınite de creatures differentes- lb ıd., I, 416. 0~: . 'There ı s an ı ~fımty of 
ereaLures in the smallest particle of matter, because of the actual dıvısıon of the contınuum to 
infinity." Theodicy § 195, Leibniz, "Gp," VI, 232. . . . 
32 Leibniz "Gp " IV 2 IO. The influence by Robert Hook's Micrographıa ıs obvıous. 
33 Stuart Brow~ "The Seventeenth-Century Intellectual Background," in The Cambridge 
Companian 1; Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
S I. · ıı . k 
34 As Garber showed there are at Jeast two metaphysical strain~ in Leibniz .. onı_o ıo_gy. 1 wı_ stıc 
to the more popular one up to now, the monadological - Danıel Garber, Leıbnı z: Physıcs and 
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Monads - step out of the Lab_vrintlı, step int o the Continuum 
As Arthur have stated: " In this wider sense, the continuum problem is: what (if 
any) are the fırst elements of things and their motions?"35 So Jet me go thro ugh these 
fırst elements and Leibniz's Monadology. Because it is a well-known territory I will 
make just a very brief summary of the most important parts for the continuum problem. 
ı. Monads36 are simple substances and they are entering compounds (#1) [qu'une 
substance simple, qui entre dans !es composes] and because they are simple they have 
no parts, neither extension nor form nor shape nor di visibility (#3) . So what we have 
here is not only a definition of a monad but these are the basic characteristics of the 
principle of the continuum. 
On the other hand monads are well-determined and different (quali tatively 
discrete) from each other (#8-9) which is the principle of discontinuity. 
So we have already two sides of the monad themsel ves - indivisibility and 
discreetness. This d ifferentia tes them both from (P) and (1) realms. 
2. Further on (#10) Leibniz writes that every created being, and consequently the 
created monad, is subject to change, and further that this change is continuous in each 
[et meme que ce changement est continue[ dans chacune] . And the source of this 
continuity is monad 's internal principle [d'un principe interne] (#ll) which he will call 
"! 'appetit" (# 15). This is the fırst s ide of the continuum. 
And the second is " la perception" (#14) which involve and represents a 
multiplic ity in the unit (#13) - which is exactly what we were looking for in 
syncategorematic continuum. 
And again we have two sictes- we have the principle of continuous change and 
we have the principle of multiplicity in unit/7• Both sictes work together, because 
Leibniz realized that every natural change takes place gradually, something changes and 
something remains unchanged (#13) - that 's the real seeret of continuity . 
The appetition is the principle of change from one perception (multipl icity in 
unity) to another (multiplic ity in unity) (# 15). So we have the variety of all particular 
changes existing o nly eminently (#38) (as a source) in the primary unity [l'unite 
primitive] (#47). And in this original simple substance [la substance simple originaire] 
there is a continuous force (#48)38 ... 
Philosophy," in The Cambridge Companian to Leibniz, ed. Nicholas Jolley (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1 995), 293-98. 
35 Richard T. W. Arthur, ' Cohesion, Division and Harmony: PhysicaJ Aspects of Leibniz's 
Continuum Problem (1671-1686)," Perspectives on Science 6, no. 1-2 [Leibniz and the 
Sciences] ( 1998): 110. 
36 1 will use mainly Jonathan Bennett' s and Robert Latta's translations. 
37 In this systemalical interpretation appetition will produce in phenomenal realm aJl time-
relations and the perception will produce aJI spatial relations. So we can abstract them further 
in ideal realm as Time and Space. 
38 Leibniz concluded in Nature ltself (1698): "not only is everything that acts an individual 
substance, but aJso every individuaJ substance acts continuously . . . ", translation by Jonathan 
Bennett, Early Modern Texts (2004 [cited 29 Feb 2008]); available from 
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. At th_e e_nd we ~an say that the monad is foundation of the syncategorematic 
contınuum ın ıts realıt~ and principle. It neuıralizes it, being simple continuum 
(monad); and preserves ıt, beıng more than one (monads). Monad vs. monads, or better 
to say monad and monads. It is the on ly way phenomenal infınity can be sustained. And 
so the Law of Continuity. 
Tlıe science of dynamics 
. So it seems that the force is somehow very important for this interpretation - it 
unıtes and_ makes t?in~s. dynamically continuous. There are many articles and analysis 
on the notıon of Leıbnız s force, so I wıll not make even as um mary here, but I will pick 
up just some very basic and important facts about the formatian of the concepı39. Of 
cou~se ~ will not talk a bout force only in a strict physical sense40, but nothing in my 
thesıs vıolates recent scholarship conclusions on Leibniz's scientific thought. 
A. In De usu Geometriae (1676) he wrote: "Only Geometry can provide a thread 
for the Labyr inth of the Composition of the Continuum, of maximum and minimum, 
and the unassignable and the infınite, and no one will arrive at a truly solid metaphysics 
who has not passed thro ug h tha t labyrinth."
41
. It is true that formulating the problem of 
continuum goes through analys is of infınity but the solution of the mature Leibniz is not 
only within the domain of the geometry. He gave up explaining everything with size, 
shape a nd motion (where geometry is quite strong) and decided to introduce the notian 
of force together with a whole new science - dynamics, which " treats force and the 
metaphysical entities"
42
. Furthermore in "Motion is not something absolute" (1686) he 
states: "And indeed eaclı substance is a kind of force of acting, or an endeavor to 
http://www.earlymodemtexts.com. After 7 years he wrote to Electress Sophie (3 1 Oct, 1705) 
abouı "entelechies or primitive forces [ ... ]are the source of everything"- Leibniz, "Gp," VII, 
565, translation by Lloyd Strickland, Leibniz Translations (Feb 2008 [citcd 29 Feb 2008]); 
available from http://www.leibniz-translations.com. And fınally in Principles of Narure and 
Grace, Based on Reason (1714) he said: "a substance isa being that is capable of acıion", 
translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
39 Leibniz's development of this notian is a slow and many-faced. Very good introduction -
where interactions beıween mechanics, scholasıicism and dynarnics are differentiated - is 
Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy. ". For a different short analysis of force's histarical 
development, see François Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoreıical Shift in the Phoranomus and 
Dynamica De Potentia," Perspecrives on Science 6. no. 1-2 (1998). 
40 Force is highly technical term which govems various laws, as Duchesneau writes: "Force is 
presented as a theoretical concept exeecding the intelligibili ty of geometrical concepts. And 
this new concept is presumed to own considerable regulative power for unifying the various 
empirical laws" Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in the Phoranomus and_Dynamica 
De Potentia," 81. Buton the other hand it isa pure metaphysical notian and as such it can be 
inıerpreted as a form, as did Leibniz. 
41 Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Contirıuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 
xxiii. 
42 Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 284. For example in "Discourse on Meıaphysics" 
( 1686), § 18 he says: "Now, this force is something different from size, shape, and ~o~ i on, and 
thisshowsus that - contrary to what our modems have talked themselves ınto belıevıng- not 
everything that we can conceive in bodies is a matter of extension and its modifıcations", 
translation by Bennett, Early Modern Text s. 
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change itself wi th respect to all the others according to certain laws of its own nature" 
[italics added]43, so we have to introduce a science which will combine forces, 
substantial forms and the ir measurement. I think that there is a connection between 
abanda ning the early categorematic conceptions of the continuum (before 1676) and 
abandaning geometry as the o nly key solution for the labyrinth of the continuum. 
B. In Letıre sur la quesıion, si 1' essence du corps consisıe dans 1' etendue (18 
June, 1691) published by Leibniz in the Journal des Savant he says: "All of this shows 
that there is in matter something else than the purely Geometrical, that is, than j ust 
extension and bare change. And in considering the matter closely, we perceive that we 
must add to them some higher or metap/ıysical notion, namely, that of substance, action 
and force; and these notions imply that anything which is acted on must act 
reciprocally, and anything which acts must receive some reaction; consequently, a body 
at rest should not be carried off by anather body in motion without changing something 
of the directian and speed of the acting body" [added italics]44. Here we can see not 
only the notion of force to be introduced but already the differentiation of the forces 
themselves- active (act on) and passive (act reciprocally). We can say that the drive-
acti ve force- is analogous to monad's appetite (that which is principle of change) and 
resistance - passive force - is analogous to monad's perception (that which unites 
multiplicity)45 . 
C. And 3 years later in his article On the Correction of Metaplıysics and the 
Concept of Subsıance (published in Acta Eruditorum, March 1694) Leibniz mentions 
for the fırst time in print the notion dynamica as a new science on force: " ... the concept 
of fo rces or powers, (which the Germans call Kraft and the French la force), and for 
whose explanation I have set up a distinct science of dynamics, brings the strongest light 
to bear upon our understanding of the true concept of substance"46. 
D. Finally in 1695 was published Specimen Dynamicum (in Acta Eruditorum) -
which presented the metaphysical foundations of the dynamics and the foundations of 
posthumously published Dynamica de potentia et legibus naturae corporae. In 
43 Leibniz, "Ag," VI-4, 1638; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Conıinuum: 
Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 333. 
44 Or we can see another defınition of dynamics: "1 judged that it was worth the trouble to 
muster the force of my reasonings through demonstrations of the greatest evidence, so that. 
little by little, 1 might lay the foundations for the true element s of the new science of power 
and acıion, which one might call dynamics." - Duchesneau, "Leibniz's Theoretical Shift in 
the Phoranomus and Dynamica De Potentia," 84. 
45 lmerpretation on letter to De Volder - Leibniz, "Gp," II, 170. It can be compared with this 
excerpt from "Principles ofNature and Grace, Based on Reason" (1714): "The qualities ofa 
monad· must be its perceptions; a perception is a represemation in something simple of 
something else that is composite. Anda monad's actioııs must be its appetitions, which are its 
tendencies to go from being in one state to being in another, i.e. to move from one perception 
to another; these tendendes are the sources of all the changes it undergoes" [iıalics added] -
Bennett, Early Modern Texts. 
46 
" ... notionem vi ri ımı seu virtutis (quam German i vocant Krafft Galli la f orce) cui ego 
explicandre peculiarem Dynamices scientiam destinavi , plurimum lucis afferre ad verarn 
ııotionem substaıırice intelligendam" ''De primre philosophire emendatione et notione 
substantire" - Leibniz, "Gp," IV-469. 
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Specimen Dynamicum Leibniz presented systematic study on primitive force and its 
relation to the substantial forms; its priority to extension and that it is a defınition of 
'substance ' (#2), its division of active, passive, primitive, derivative (#6-7), dead, live 
(#12), total, partial (#13) their measurement (#30) and so on ... Further more he stated 
there: "In conforınity with the Law of Continuity. which rules out jumps, rest can be 
considered as a special case of motion - that is, as vanishingly smail or minimal motion 
-and equality can be considered as a case of vanishingly smail inequality" 47. Motion is 
the effect of force - so there is continuity in effects because there is continuiry in the 
force itself Effects are part of the phenomenal realm (P) and primitive forces are 
constituents of the real realm (R). 
One more remark; it is well known that Leibniz incorporated Hobbesian conatus 
(endeavour) in his terminology48 and embraced d ynamics as after-Cartesian solutio n to 
some Cartesian problems (as conservation of quantity of motion). So we can schematize 
the appearance of force as: ılıere is 110 meclıanical solution to the contimamı problem, 
so we need a dynamical one. 
(R)-(P)-(1) and the Law ofContinuity 
Let me make one fina! stroke by interconnecting the three realms: space and time 
are abstractions from the phenomenal world. But what has this phenomenal world in 
itself that can be abstracted in a form of continuum in the ideal realm? It has monadic 
substratum, it has substraıic unities, so from phenomenal realm we abstracı its real 
characteristics to makean ideal realm. In a Jetter to Arnauld (April 30th 1687) Leibniz 
postulated one crucial axiomatic statement which is "[an] identical proposition which 
varies only in emphasis: that what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either"
49
. 
Oneness (unity) is our fına l step and it is c lear why Leibniz decided to use exactly the 
word " monad" as a constituent of the (R)-realm. 
Let me makean overall summary of the continuum in his Weltanschauung. 
~7 Translation by Bennett, Early Modern Texts. . . .. . 
48 For more detai1s see Howard Bem stein, "Conatus, Hobbes, and the Young Leıbnı z, Studıes 
in History and Philosophy of S ci e nce ı J , no. J ( 1980) and Alan .Gabbey, " Fare~ and lnenia in 
Seventeenth-Century Dynamics," Studies in History and Phılosophy of Scıence 2, no. 1 
( 1971). . 
49 Gotıfried Leibniz and Amauld, The Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence, ed. R. C. Sleıgh , Jr, 
trans. H. T. Mason, The Philosophy of Leibniz - Fourteen of the Most lmportant Bo?ks on 
Leibniz's Plıilosoplıy Reprinted ;11 Fifteen Volunıes (New York/London: Garl~d Publıshıng, 
1985) 121. " ... ce qui n'est pas veritabiement U/1 estre, n'est pas nan p]US verıtabiement Un 
estre.':- Leibniz. "Gp," Il, 97. 
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(R) (P) (1) 
Realm 
Real Phenomenal .Ideal 
Knowledge Metaphysical Physical Mathematica I 
Constituents M ona ds Bodies/ Aggregaıes Figures 
50 
Characteristics
51 Perception and Appeıite Matter and Motion Space and Time 
Type of continuity Dynamical Syncategorematical Pure abstract 
Law of continuity There is a force. 
There's always a 
middle term 
52 There's a whole. 
Unity of contiguity Contiguity to infinity 
Features (uniqueness) and 
(dense)
53 Conlinui ty to infinity. 
conıinuity (change). 
Number of 2- (monads are different): 2- each thing has i ts O- interiorly boundaries between O- (monad is 
own boundary 
55 unbounded. things undividable) 
54 
Suffıcient reason 
Domain (unity of actual and Actual. Possible. 
possible). 
Priority 
Monad is prior to both pan Pan is prior to the Whole is prior to the 
and the whole. whole. part. 
Simplest One is simpler. Pan is simpler. Whole is simpler. 
lnfinity: Cornpendia 
loquendi Mirror Fold lnfinitesimal 
[Visual metaphor] [ .] [ ... ] [0] 
K ey One Part Wlıole 
Now we can demons trate the unity of the Law of Continuity. It seems that we 
have three different types of continuum (R)-(P)-(1), but actually it is o nly one: real, 
50 Figures, but maybe not numbers; see Crockeıt , "Continuity in Leibniz's Mat u re Metaphysics." 
134. and compare it with Levey, "Matter and Two Concepts ofContinuity in Leibniz," 87. 
s ı These can be regrouped in two analogous chains: Perception-Maıter-Space and Appetite-
Motion-Time. For example in Naıure ltself (1698), § 1 i Leibniz locates the notion of primary 
matter in passive force - Bennett, Early Modern Text s. 
52 
When formulated, Leibniz's Law of Continuity was explained as: there is always something 
in between during any change from small to large (or vice versa). 
53 
This is Crockett's "structural continuity" - Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature 
Metaphysics;" 128. But, of course (though it resembles the ideal realm), there is no parallel to 
his "metaphysical continuity" because it is based on density which doesn' t make sense 
applied to figures and numbers - Crockett, "Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics," 
130. 
54 W e cannot talk about real boundaries in the (R)-realm. 
ss "For by the very fact that the pans are discontinuous, each will have its own separate 
boundaries [terminos]"- Leibniz, "Ag," Vl-2, 435. So the number ofboundaries in the whole 
world will be always even. As Levey wrote: "discontinuous things, by contrast with 
continuous ones, are those whose boundaries are two." - Levey, "Matter and Two Concepıs 
of Continuity in Leibniz," 84. 
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phenomenal and ideal altogethe r -. (RPI). It is a one wlıole w it/ı parts, multiplicity 
unıted by force. ~nd I am no t talkıng abo ut the World itself, only about the law, (it 
woul~ have been ıncorrect to state that the world has its own monad or soul)56. ı am not 
claımıng that there_ are no differences between the realms - exactly the opposite _ 
because there are d ı fferences the Law of Continuity is recursive and the engine of this 
recursion is the force. 
IV. Conclusion 
"In actual bodies there is o nly discrete quantity, that is, a multitude of mo nads or 
of simple substances, though in any sensible aggregate or one corresponding to 
phenomena, this may be greater than any given number. But a continuous quantity is 
something ideal which pertains to p ossible and to actualities only insofar as they are 
possible. A continuum, that is , involves indeterminate parts, while on the other hand, 
there is nothing indefınite in actual things, in which every division is made that can be 
made. Actual things are compounded as is number out of wıities, ideal things as is a 
number out of fra ctions; the parts are actually in the real whole but not in the ideal 
whole. But we confuse ideal witlı real substances when we seek for actual parts in the 
order of possibilities, and indeterminate parts in the aggregate of actual things, and so 
entangle ourselves in the labyrinth of the continuum and in contradictions that cannot be 
explained. Meanwhile the knowledge of the continuous, that is, of possibilities, contains 
eternal truths which are never violated by actua l phenomena, s ince the difference is 
always less than any g iven assignable amount." [italics added]
57
. 
This is a really good resume by Leibniz. It is obvious he is talking only about 
two types of realm (actualities vs. possible), although he is much more precise when 
further differentiating real from phenomenal. B y this citation we can assume that 
monadic level has the same type of syncategorematic structure as the matter itself, but 
what I wanted to show is that wi thin the realm of monads next to the ir "discreetness" 
lies the principle of continuous change and the principle of oneness (simple substances) 
- what is not truly one entity is not truly one entity either. This is the difference between 
56 In De mundo praeseti ( 1684-1 686) Leibniz wrote: "The aggregate of all bodies is cal led ıhe 
world, which, if it is infini te, is not even one entity, any more lhan an infini te straight line or 
the greatest number are. So God cannot be understood as the World Soul: not the soul of a 
fı nite world because God himself is infınite , and not of an infın i te world because an infınite 
body cannot be understood as one entity [unum Ens], but that which is not one in itself [unum 
per se] has no substantial form, and therefore no soul." - Leibniz, "Ag," VI-4, 1509. More 
about this in Gregory Brown, "Leibniz's Mathematical Argument against a Soul of the 
World," British Journal for the History of Philosoplıy 13, no. 3 (2005). But this can be 
compared with his earlier thoughts in On the Seeret s of the Sublime ( 1676): "[God] exist asa 
whole soul in the whole body of the world" - Leibniz, "Ag," VI-3, 474; translation from 
Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, 1672-1686 
48. 
57 Leibniz in a Jetter to De Volder (1 9 Jan, 1706) - Brown, "Leibniz's Mathematical Argument 
against a Soul of the World," 468; Leibniz, "Gp," II, 282. My cl ai m is stronger than what we 
see here in the Iast sentence. Jt' s not only about this epistemologically unassignable error, but 
it is because ıhere is multiplicity in unity and unity of the multiplicity. 
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syncategorematical and dynamical continuum which I tried to present- introduction of 
the force. As Leibniz said "The cohesiveness of bodies is the quantity offorce needed to 
destroy their contiguity" [italics addedj58. 
The same force which keeps together the unity of the world is the force to grasp 
the multiplicity in unity (in our mind and in reality) and it is the force which sustains 
syncategorematic continuum by making it one. And the same force, abstracted, can 
produce the ideal Space (by monads ' perception) and ideal Time (by monads' 
appetite)59; and in the opposite directian to reduce them via phenomenal world to the 
monads themselves. And the same force makes this world dynamical and thinkable. So 
the solution of the continuum problem cannot be plainly mathematical (ideal), and it 
cannot be plainly physical (phenornenal), but it can be both ... and united by one (real) 
metaphysical principle. And even the histarical period - Baroque - is always 
syncategorematically folded, as Deleuze said: "the characteristic of the Baroque is the 
fold that goes on to infınity"60 . But if the fold should be one it needs a deeper dynamical 
level. So in Leibnizian world each doubling in itself is dynamical, syncategorematical 
and geometrically ideal. 
We can make anather (this time epistemological) parallel; Leibniz wrote in 
Contingency (1686) that every analysis of a contingent proposition continues to infınity 
-you have a cause for the ca use for the ca use for the cause .. . so you will ne ver have a 
complete demonstration. Buton the other hand there is always an underlying complete 
and fina! reason for the truth of the proposition (only God completely gr_asps it, as being 
the only one who can whip through the infınite series in one stroke of the mind)61 . And 
so contingent cause is contiguously continuous and suffıcient reason is dynamically 
continuous. 
So at the end we should have only one Law of Continuity which corresponds to 
the three different realm structures. Which means that continuity wi\1 have 3 different 
structural manifestations but the law is one and the same - so even here we have 
multiplicity in one unity? The Law itself is meaningful only applied in (RPI) together 
and th is is a subtle hint against the recent scho larship debate about "Was Leibniz an 
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Leibniz, "Ag," VI-3, 94; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of the Continuum: Writings 
on the Conıinuum Problem, 1672-1686 19. Sametimes the influence of Descartes is stili 
visible when Leibniz is talking not about force, but about motion as in On the Seeret s of the 
Sublime (1676), but the idea is similar: "Matter is a discrete being [ens discretum] , not a 
continuous one; it is only contiguous, and is united by motion or by a nıind of some sort." 
[italics added]- Leibniz, "Ag," YI-3, 474; translation from Leibniz, The Labyrinth of ıhe 
Continuum: Writings on the Continıwm Problem, 1672-1686 47. 
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Compare this with the hint given by Garber: "extension, is properly speaking, a direct 
consequence of the properties bodies have by virtue of which they resisı penetration by other 
bodies" - Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 291. But than Garber is puzzıed by ıhe 
diagram from ı 7 ı 5 in the letter to De Bosses where primitive forces are only in this part of 
the (R)-realm which is substantia compasila - Leibniz, "Gp," II, 506. And I arn not sure why 
Garber expects them "on the other side of the chart, in the characıerization of 
semisubstances" ... - Garber, "Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy," 298. 
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Gilles Deleuze, "The Fold," Ya/e French Studies 80 (Baroque Topographies: 
Literature!History/Philosophy) ( 1991 ): 227. 
61 Bennett, Early Modern Texts . 
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ideal i s~?''. b.ecause what is most important in Leibniz dynamics about continuity ... is 
the recıprocıty (RPI) of force, the reciprocity (RPI) of unity-multiplicity pair which is a 
pair connected by force62. 
Leibniz and Zeno- tlıe last words 
Of course, we cannot dea! with the continuum problem non-mentionina Zeno 
b ' 
though there was no time, no r space, nor motion to include him in this paper. Stili I 
would !ike to add one short question and even shorter answer. I was thinking can we 
illustrate the Leibniz solution to the continuum problem by re-reading for example 
Dichotomy asa dialogue and giving it a possible Leibnizian answer. 
Zeno: - That which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage (112) 
before it arrives at the goal (1 ). And than if you pick the half-way stage (1/2) as your 
new goal you must fırst arrive at i ts half-way stage (1/4). And so on, 1/8, 1116, 1/32 ... 
to infinity. So how is it possible, dear Leibniz, to overcome that infinity? 
Leibniz:- By force, Zeno, by force ... 
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